Following the republican revival of the last few decades, the ideal of freedom as non-domination has become an important point of convergence among republican theorists, especially among those associated with neo-Roman republicanism. Furthermore, all neo-Roman theorists argue that a legitimate republican polity in contemporary societies must take a democratic form to overcome the aristocratic and elitist features pervasive in classical and modern republicanism. This study argues that the emerging concept of republican democracy remains essentially contested despite the increasing agreement on the ideal of liberty being constitutive of the republican tradition. It posits that the meaning of the concept of republican democracy becomes unstable in the transition from the normative ideal to the institutional level of neo-republican reasoning, which is evidenced by the fact that neo-Roman theorists embrace the ideal of non-domination but disagree on the characteristics of the institutional design capable of realizing that ideal. To substantiate this argument, the study compares three recent models of democracy that are somehow associated with neo-Roman republicanism-the electoral-contestatory model, the political constitutionalism model, and the Machiavellian democracy model, championed by
ver the past two decades, the concept of freedom as non-domination has become the main normative principle of neo-republicanism.
Furthermore, as recently noted by Nadia Urbinati, a critic of this approach, "the neo-Roman republican theory of freedom as non-domination has acquired a leading status in political science and redesigned the geography of political studies" (URBINATI, 2012, p. 607) . This study seeks to answer the following question: what kind of institutional arrangement is most suitable for the realization of such an ideal of liberty? Therefore, in this study, I will examine the most recent developments in the field of democratic theory related to "neo-Roman republicanism" 1 . I will focus on three different models of democracy. Following the designations prescribed by their main formulators, I will refer to the "electoralcontestatory" model, the "political constitutionalism" model, and the "Machiavellian democracy" model developed in the works of Philip Pettit, Richard Bellamy, and John McCormick, respectively 2 . I intend to demonstrate that these three institutional models can be understood as competing definitions of the concept of republican democracy, as they represent different institutional solutions to the same normative problem, namely the problem of how to realize non-domination. Also, I wish to suggest that the internal tensions in the concept of republican democracy should not be interpreted as contradictions to be overcome for the sake of stabilizing its semantic meaning. I neither defend the claim of superiority of one definition over the others nor produce a synthesis of them.
Rather, I argue that the concept of republican democracy should be understood as an "essentially contested concept".
The notion of "essentially contested concept" was introduced in the mid1950s by the Scottish philosopher, Walter Gallie. He coined the phrase to label those concepts which are resistant to consensual definitions. According to Gallie, "Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recognition of rival uses of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly
1
The description of republicanism as a tradition of thought whose genesis dates back to ancient Roman republic is mainly made by Skinner (1996) and Pettit (1997) . 2 For more than a decade, these authors have presented pieces of their models in the form of articles and essays. While some of these pieces are cited in this study, I predominantly rely on their recent books, which are entirely devoted to the full articulation of their respective democratic theories: Pettit (2012) , McCormick (2011 ), Bellamy (2007 .
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'likely', but as of permanent potential critical value to one's own use or interpretation of the concept in question" (GALLIE, 1956, p. 193) . However, this does not sufficiently recognize that different users understand certain concepts differently. A theorist can only adequately argue for her application criteria of a concept if she also argues against the criteria of her opponents. "More simply, to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses.
Still more simply, to use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and defensively" (GALLIE, 1956, p. 172 ).
Gallie specified several criteria that allow us to recognize the essentially contested character of a concept 3 . Two of these criteria are more relevant to the concept of republican democracy. Firstly, every essentially contested concept possesses an appraisive nature, insofar as its use allows not only a description of certain states of the world but also, inevitably, a judgment of-and a value assignment to-the states of the world so described. Secondly, the essential contestability of a concept usually reflects the accretion of different layers of semantic meaning throughout the course of the concept's life. Perhaps the most famous defense of the historical roots of conceptual contestability is Nietzsche's statement that "all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined" (NIETZSCHE, 2006, p. 53 ).
In the discussion of the concept of republican democracy, this study will first present a brief outline of the notion of freedom as non-domination as formulated by Quentin Skinner and Pettit. Subsequently, I not only describe the main characteristics of each of the three models of republican democracy under scrutiny but also emphasize the diversity of institutional forms proposed to achieve non-domination. I employ Pettit's model as the point of departure for my analysis; thereafter, I address Bellamy and McCormick's objections against his 3 Since Gallie's original proposal, many scholars of different persuasions have contributed to refining and criticizing the notion of "essentially contested concepts". See: Connolly (1993), Gray (1977) , Lukes (1975) , MacIntyre (1973) , Waldron (2002) , and Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu (2006) . This study does not aim to examine the theoretical and methodological dimensions of Gallie's notion. My extended discussion regarding the "essentially contested concepts" and its significance for conceptual history can be found in Silva (2013) . (2015) 9 (1) 3 -38 "electoral-contestatory" model, as well as the main aspects of their own alternative models of democracy. Finally, I compare the specific ways the three models respond to certain dilemmas of contemporary liberal democracies.
Non-domination as a political ideal: from Skinner to Pettit
In his studies on the resumption of republicanism in the context of the Italian Renaissance, Skinner has argued that the concept of freedom peculiar to the republican tradition does not fit into the concept of positive freedom understood as self-government, whose typical political expression would be the active participation of citizens in the public sphere. In this respect, Skinner's narrative opposes that of John Pocock, his colleague from the "Cambridge school", who believes that the republican tradition conceives the human being in such a way that "his nature was completed only in a vita activa practiced in a vivere civile" (POCOCK, 1985, pp. 40-41) . Skinner not only rejected this positive definition of republican liberty, but also stated that republicanism is organized around a typical negative conception of freedom, understood as the absence of external impediments to the pursuit of ends chosen by individuals. Focusing on the writings of Machiavelli, Skinner came to believe that the Florentine had no quarrels with the Hobbesian assumption "that the capacity to pursue such ends without obstruction is what the term 'liberty' properly signifieth" (SKINNER, 1984, p. 217) .
Nonetheless, civic humanists and communitarians were only one of the targets of Skinner's critique. The other was liberalism, both in its utilitarian and contractarian forms. Consequently, he promptly stated that, although being negative, republican liberty could not dispense with the involvement of citizens in public affairs. The desire of maintaining freedom without political participation would represent a serious "failure of rationality" (SKINNER, 1986, p. 243 One of the first attacks on Skinner's "instrumental republicanism" can be found in Patten (1996) . A reaction to Patten's critique appears in Maynor (2002) . upon examination to be instrumentally necessary to the avoidance of coercion and servitude, and thus to be necessary conditions of assuring any degree of personal liberty in the ordinary Hobbesian sense of the term" (SKINNER, 1986, p. 217) .
The difference then pointed out by Skinner had the virtue of emphasizing the importance of participation for the maintenance of liberty; however, it was not adequately cogent to reveal any significant conceptual distinction between the republican "negative" liberty, inspired by Machiavelli, and the liberal negative liberty, heir of Hobbes' original formulation 5 . Skinner's approach made republican liberty seem like a juxtaposition of both concepts. However, the mere addition of these two conceptions did not result in a third one. Is it possible that republicanism is only a type of liberalism dressed in participatory costumes?
The search for a negative answer to that question led Skinner to reformulate his vision, and he made this move by means of a gradual incorporation of Pettit's conceptual innovations (SILVA, 2008) . If, in Liberty Before Liberalism (1997), Skinner takes an important step toward the conception of republican liberty articulated by Pettit, in his most recent studies he consolidates his allegiance to Pettit's "third concept of freedom", a concept defined by the single criterion of "absence of arbitrary power" (SKINNER, 2001; 2008b) 6 .
The point of departure of Pettit's conception of freedom is a critique of Isaiah Berlin's dichotomy between positive and negative liberty. For Pettit, Berlin's taxonomy of positive and negative liberty forecloses a more or less salient third possibility. He thinks of positive liberty as mastery over the self and of negative liberty as the absence of interference by others. Yet mastery and interference do not amount to the same thing. So what of the intermediate possibility that freedom consists in an absence, as the negative conception has it, but in an absence of mastery by others, not in an absence of interference? (PETTIT, 1997, p. 21) Going beyond Skinner, Pettit develops a new argument for the distinction between the negative conceptions of freedom of republicanism and liberalism. 5 In a gesture at odds with his former methodological prescriptions, Skinner has recently stated that the concept of liberty formulated by Hobbes in the middle of 16th century is "treated as an article of faith by most Anglophone liberal thinkers nowadays" (SKINNER, 2008a, p. 213) . 6 Pettit criticized some aspects of Skinner's former position in Pettit (2002) . Freedom is ideally defined as the absence of domination. Both from the sociological and constitutional points of view, the ideal of non-domination is richer than that of non-interference. To illustrate this argument, he invites us to contemplate two situations: in the first, the ideal of non-domination allows us to detect forms of negation of freedom ignored by the ideal of non-interference, and the second is a situation in which the ideal of non-domination makes us see the occurrence of freedom where the ideal of noninterference sees a lack of freedom.
To illustrate the first situation, Pettit often uses the example of a hypothetical relationship between a benevolent master and his slave. In this situation, the master can prevent himself from interfering with the choices of his slave; he can allow the slave to do whatever he wants and can even provide the means to broaden the range of choices available to the slave. From the point of view of the ideal of non-interference, in this situation, the negative freedom of the slave would be preserved, since the slave would not be suffering any actual interference from his master. For Pettit, however, the republican conception of negative liberty does not possess, as its essential requirement, the absence of actual interference. The crucial requirement is that no agent in any given social relation holds a status that makes it possible for him to arbitrarily interfere with the choices and actions of others. The paradox of the "free slave" vanishes with the conception of liberty as non-domination. It does not matter how benevolent the master is; the slave is still bound to his social status as a mere subject under the dominium of an "alien power" (PETTIT, 2008) .
With regard to the second situation, Pettit has in mind the inevitable constraints of laws on the range of choices of all citizens, even in the most democratic regimes. Even though any law is an obvious case of interference, if it is attuned to the "common avowable interests" of the individuals over whom it is exercised, it should be considered a non-arbitrary interference. In short, unlike the negative freedom defined by Berlin, Pettit's negative liberty admits, first, domination without interference, and second, interference without domination (PETTIT, 1997, p. 23) .
Since the ideal of non-domination is related to the ascription of a certain status to individuals, the problem of how to ensure the resilience of said status becomes the central issue of the republican institutional imagination. Indeed, to
Berlin, nothing prevents a "liberal-minded despot" from adequately fulfilling the role of the guardian of liberty since this role "is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government" (BERLIN, 1969, p. 129 ). This view is similar to Hobbes' famous discussion on the "liberty of subjects"
in Leviathan, where he says that "whether a Commonwealth be monarchical or popular, the freedom is still the same" (HOBBES, 1996, p. 143 Republicans are democrats first and foremost: they believe that freedom depends on self-government" (SKINNER, 2007, p. 110) .
Nevertheless, even if we assume that Skinner is right to point out this specific difference between republicans and liberals, we must recognize that the institutional design conceived as the most suitable to allow liberty to flourish is far from being consensual among the different advocates of the republican tradition.
The meanings attributed to the notions of self-government and democracy continue to divide republicans among themselves, even when we consider only those influenced by the neo-Roman tradition. I will now address this issue.
The electoral-contestatory model and people's negative powers
Since the publication of Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997) , Pettit has been arguing for a model of democracy allegedly designed to realize the ideal of freedom as non-domination (SILVA, 2007; . It consists of an institutional set that the author has named the "electoralcontestatory" model (PETTIT, 1999; 2000; 2004 citizen can offer traffic directions with the expectation that the drivers follow his instructions. As he is not granted the same recognition as traffic authorities, including the power of police, the more likely outcome is that some drivers may follow his instructions while many will ignore them. We cannot say that the citizen who tries to direct traffic has no influence in the situation in which he is interfering. It is even likely that his actions contribute to increasing the chaos, causing a situation that was already bad to become even worse. Although the situation changes because of his inputs, that change does not abide by his intended designs. In order for him to achieve any control in that situation, it is essential that his influence imposes a "relevant direction on the process, helping to ensure that a suitable result transpires" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 153) .
As maintained by Pettit, controlling a process can be achieved by means of three different forms of influence: active influence, virtual influence, and reserve influence. Here too, Pettit resorts to an illustration to explain his concepts. He asks us to imagine ourselves horseback riding. You could exert an active influence on the direction you are riding in every time you pull the reins, directing the horse to where you wish it to go. Virtual influence can be obtained when you refrain from pulling the reins, allowing the horse to independently follow your direction. In this case, you need to be ready to intervene and pull the reins if the horse begins to follow a different direction. In the case of reserve influence, you would allow the horse to freely move wherever it wanted to go. In the absence of a riding plan, you reserve the privilege of pulling the reins if you change your mind, guiding the horse in a direction that it would not have followed on its own. A legitimate state, one under the control of the demos, should rely on institutions able to channel these different forms of popular influence. On this matter, Pettit discusses the role of the assemblies, the most relevant institution for the embodiment and promotion of the people's influence on legislation and government policies. He distinguishes three types of assemblies, each of them connected with specific strands in the broad tradition of the theory and practice of democracy: plenary assembly, indicative assembly, and responsive assembly. Pettit advocates the advantages of the latter over the first two.
Pettit rejects the plenary assembly, among other reasons, because of its "infeasibility". According to Pettit (2012, p. 189) , it has often mistakenly been
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associated with Athenian democracy even though its modern history has its conceptual genesis in the thought of absolutist theorists, such as Bodin and Hobbes. These two opponents of the republican principle of the "mixed constitution" considered the proposition of a sovereign power composed of heterogeneous parts an absurd idea, as it is likely to stimulate civil war rather than social harmony. Afterwards, this appeal to the indivisibility of sovereignty migrated from absolutism to republican and democratic thinking at the hands of Rousseau 8 . Following the steps of the absolutist theorists, Rousseau rejected the idea of a mixed constitution. However, given his endorsement of the ideal of nondomination, he diverged from Bodin and Hobbes, claiming that democracy was the only form of government compatible with freedom. By forming assemblies and rejecting the institution of intermediaries or representatives, citizens should directly create laws, exerting an active influence. Rousseau "held that the people should gather periodically in a sovereign assembly to deliberate and decide upon laws and that they should then give the job of implementing and adjudicating those laws to appointed magistrates" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 190) .
Apart from its practical and operational limitations-such as the inability to convene all the members of a political community composed of a large number of citizens under the same roof-, the model of plenary assembly is also undermined by its incapacity to present a solution to the "discursive dilemma" that results from the contradiction between individual decisions and the aggregate vote of a majority decision. Therefore, "the problem with the plenary assembly is that while the participants might be individually consistent in their final judgments and votes on a range of connected issues, they would be liable to generate an inconsistent body of judgments if they relied on majority voting for the aggregation of their individual sets of judgments into a common, shared set" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 191) . elections. This includes the freedoms of press, association and travel, which are indispensable "if people are to be able to stand for office, combine in parties, promote their polices, and expose other parties, including the governing party, to criticism between and at the time of elections" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 201) . Second, it presents a greater capacity to generate alternative policies and to test policies as a whole, being better able to avoid "false negatives" (the failure to give expression to the variety of policies compatible with the common interest) and "false positives"
(the failure to avoid policies against the common interest). Thirdly, the responsive assembly is less likely to violate the principle of non-domination as it lacks the concentration of powers of the indicative assembly when it is given the "full range of legislative issues". In such circumstances, an indicative body has the power to raise legislative questions and determine the answers to those questions. By concentrating on these two prerogatives without facing electoral challenges, the will of the indicative assembly "may be difficult for the people to control and render undominating" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 205) .
Although the responsive assembly is the most suitable means to ensure people have the ability to influence the government, it is insufficient to translate influence into control. In order for the control over government to be in the hands of the people, influence must be individualized, unconditional, and effective.
However, electoral institutions present shortcomings for the full realization of these three requirements. Pettit restates that while elections are a necessary condition for democracy, they are insufficient. Accordingly, he proposes institutional reforms aimed at correcting the deviations of the electoral dimension of democracy. The spirit of these reforms consists in superposing a contestatory dimension upon the electoral dimension of democracy.
The individualized system of popular influence requires that every citizen have equal access to the full range of one's political rights. Undoubtedly, representative democracy based on universal suffrage, with its motto "one person, one vote", is superior to anti-egalitarian alternatives, such as that outlined by John Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century, which attributed extra votes to more educated citizens. The equal right to vote and its uniform value among citizens is an unavoidable prerequisite for a system of individualized influence. Nonetheless, Pettit argues that we also need something else. Although the unitary and universal vote has represented major progress for the constitution of an individualized system of popular influence, it lacks the means to generate safeguards against the so-called "tyranny of the majority", a recurrent concern for Pettit and many theorists of republican democracy. How can we repair the deficiencies of the electoral system in order to protect individuals from the uncontrolled will of the majority? How can we prevent an individualized system of equal votes from being a source of persistent division between the majority and the minority, causing the latter to be a perpetual loser in the competitive play for political influence?
According to Pettit, there is "only one realistic possibility, which is to introduce a system of individualized contestation that parallels the collective challenge that elections make possible" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 213) . There are several institutional mechanisms for this purpose. Such mechanisms include "executive authorities like electoral commissions or central banks, contestatory authorities like ombudsman or auditor bodies, and, of course, the judicial authorities represented in various courts and tribunals" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 306) . In addition to these regular institutional mechanisms, the author points out that the contestatory practices may take place by way of social movements and even take forms that are more radical. "At the limit, it may also involve civil disobedience: that is, openly violating the law, inviting arrest, and accepting punishment in expression of your opposition to something done or proposed by government" (PETTIT, 2014, p. 115 ).
Pettit refers to the contestatory mechanisms as the "editorial" dimension of democracy, designed to supplement and correct its "authorial" dimension.
Electoral processes make possible the positive expression of the people as a collective "author" of public decisions. However, republican democracy should also be open to the people's participation in their individual and negative expressions.
The people are not only a collective entity formed in the electoral process; rather the people is constituted by individuals who must have their rights of participation in public affairs ensured between elections. Even if this kind of participation is less potent because it is conducted by individuals or minority groups, it is more accurate, as it expresses the will of individuals or groups directly affected by government decisions. As suggested above, this type of participation has a negative nature, since it does not create or institute a new law or policy. Citizens participate (2015) 9 (1) 3 -38
to say "no" or to restrain or fix on behalf of the common interests of the community, something already essentially created by the collective people, the author of democracy.
By inhibiting the "tyranny of the majority", the contestatory mechanisms create the conditions for the maintenance of an individualized system of popular influence. However, Pettit argues that any popular influence must also be unconditional and efficacious in order to ensure the government remains under the control of the people. The popular influence proves to be unconditional to the extent that it does not depend on the consent or willingness of government officials, or on any other external power, to exist. In addition, it will be efficacious to the extent that its results are legitimate in the eyes of all citizens, even for those who disapprove of particular policies or government decisions. In this case, citizens understand government decisions that are detrimental to their interests as random events, as setbacks resulting from bad luck, and not from domination imposed by an arbitrary power. A legitimate state action must pass through what Pettit defines as the "tough luck test" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 177; 2014, pp. 142-144) .
In short, the institutional configuration of republican democracy entails the combination of a mixed constitution, and electoral and contestatory institutions. Pettit also stresses that this structure would not work properly in the context of widespread political apathy. Therefore, the last requirement, and final guarantee, of a government conducted on the people's terms is the presence of an active citizenry willing to exercise the powers required to challenge laws and policies potentially detrimental to liberty as non-domination 9 . Pettit also presents this complex arrangement as the most suitable to accomplish what he describes as the "dual aspect" model of democracy. On the one hand, it facilitates a robust popular influence over day-to-day policy-making; on the other, it helps to impose a progressive direction to influence, in the long-term, the promotion of egalitarian political and social reforms guided by the ideal of non-domination (PETTIT, 2012, p. 252) . Similarly to Skinner and Pettit, Bellamy challenges the identity between republican liberty (self mastery) and political participation (autonomy). There is no doubt that the republic is the regime of self-government required if equal freedom is the goal. However, that does not prompt the adoption of the model of the plenary assembly, which encourages the active and direct participation of all citizens in public decisions. Such a model is unnecessary as "the negative desire to avoid domination is sufficient to motivate a concern with self-rule" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 155) . The role of participation is arguably relevant for the fulfillment of the ideal of non-domination, however, it is more instrumental than anything else.
Political constitutionalism as a pluralist model of republican democracy
What really matters is political equality among citizens, since "the notion of non- Pettit subscribes to a substantive conception of legal constitutionalism. He assumes the existence of common interests that would give us a frame of reference for distinguishing domination from non-domination in government actions.
Bellamy defies the "objectivism" implicit in the notion of "common recognizable interests" and inveighs against the thesis that such interests find their last line of defense in institutions immune from the hazards of political struggle-institutions that would congregate the best guardians of liberty. The problem with this thesis is that it is based on myths related to legal constitutionalism. It presupposes the rationalization and depoliticization of the deliberative process in order for laws and policies attuned to the common good to be generated. However, rationalization and depoliticization are two tendencies opposed to democracy 11 .
Pettit assumes that the participants of a deliberative process in the context of public debate have a willingness to overcome their self-interests when they are exposed to rational arguments. This alleged willingness would allow for the convergence of different points of view toward a substantive notion of "common recognizable interests". However, Bellamy noticed a problem in this "idealized political process". In the realm of real politics, we cannot count on the assumption of a "hypothetically possible convergence on substance". For Bellamy, the "dilemma confronting real politics is that no such convergence is likely". Furthermore, Pettit seems not to fully recognize that in actual circumstances of disagreement, the political process not only has the function of informing the decision-making process, but also of "authorizing the decision-maker to take decisions that at least some will disagree with" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 164) . In other words, Pettit loses sight of the fact that the exercise of public reason is more important for legitimizing decision-making than for reaching an allegedly objective informed decision based on the consensus among the many participants about their supposedly common recognizable interests.
Pettit does not ignore the fact that governmental decisions may lack consensus because of their possible divorce from the common interest, nor the propensity of governments to impose domination. As we have seen, Pettit proposes the neutralization of this perceptible threat by means of a set of 11 At this point, Bellamy's criticism is akin to the objections raised by Nadia Urbinati, a liberal critic of Pettit's republicanism. See: Urbinati (2010) .
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contestatory institutions situated outside and above the partisan political process, characterized by the unavoidable disagreement between its participants and the supremacy of majority rule. However, Bellamy interprets this solution as a strategy of depoliticizing the deliberative process consistent with Pettit's adherence to legal constitutionalism. In practical terms, this solution consists in transferring the final word about conflict resolution from the political context to "apolitical" authorities, such as courts and specialists councils, supposedly guided by the ideal of impartiality 12 . The problem here, according to Bellamy, is that this prospect of an aseptic democratic politics is far from delivering what it promises.
The difficulties that lurk in Pettit's model are the same that weaken legal constitutionalism. Firstly, there is no guarantee that people can reach consensus on the substantive meanings and practical consequences of a particular right or law. Bellamy uses the Rawlsian notion of "reasonable disagreement" to make the point that "people may reasonably hold differing views of not only the sources and substance of rights, but also their subject and scope, and how they might best be secured" (BELLAMY, 2013, p. 256) . Secondly, most strictures that affect the behavior of common people also apply to the behavior of the experts who monopolize the decision-making process of contestatory institutions. Thus, for example, judges in courts and economists in central banks are always involved in intra-institutional debates. These so-called apolitical agents cannot avoid taking sides in disputes over values and interests that also divide common citizens and their representatives in electoral and partisan politics. Although those disputes are settled in specialized and technical discourses, most decisions are still taken through majoritarian voting by the members of the apolitical bodies. That recourse to voting suggests the essentially contested nature of the terms of the debate.
There is no room for impartiality. In any area of expertise, there are irresolvable controversies about the proper approach for solving a particular problem. "Far from being the product of a more deliberative and objective approach to a question, an expert consensus may merely result from the hegemony within a given profession of a certain theory or approach" (BELLAMY, 2009, p. 117 ).
12
For a French perspective of impartiality as a new "figure" of democratic legitimacy, see: Rosanvallon (2008) . According to Urbinati (2010), Rosanvallon's democratic theory coincides with Pettit's theory in many respects, as they both encourage the "depolitization" of the democratic process.
Bellamy notes a sort of "Platonism" in Pettit's belief that some individuals possess certain abilities that make them more capable than ordinary citizens to make proper governmental decisions. The objectivist view of the notion of common interest, namely the call for rationalization of public debates and the suggestion of the depoliticization of important arenas of decision-making, are examples of Pettit's proximity to the "platonic argument for guardianship: the doctrine that those who possess knowledge of 'royal science' of government should rule" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 168) . However, appeals to this "guardianship theory" are not consistent with democracy and political equality. Does Bellamy envisage an alternative to overcome the flaws of Pettit's model? How can democratic institutions be redesigned in order to ensure the republican ideal of non-domination is achieved? If political equality and freedom as non-domination are the norms of political constitutionalism, how will it transpire? Bellamy argues that a freedom-oriented polity will appear in the mechanisms of "public reason" and in the "balance of power".
Trying to maintain a distance from substantive and epistemic conceptions of public reason, Bellamy defends a radical procedural and political account of it, which avoids the appeal to principles such as the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" and the Habermasian "ideal speech situation". Instead, he appeals to the republican principle, inherited from the ars rhetorica, according to which we must "hear the other side" (audi alteram partem). Substantive and epistemic views of public reason have tended to neglect "considerations of power and disagreement" (BELLAMY, 2007, p.177) , presenting constitutional courts and specialized deliberative bodies, like the Citizens' Juries, as privileged loci for the exercise of public reason. In contrast, the political procedural vision recognizes the complete and irremediable immersion of public reason in the "circumstance of political disagreement". From this point of view, "public reasoning serves less as a mode of justification and more as a means for legitimating decisions by offering a due process that acknowledges the equal moral right of all citizens to be regarded as autonomous reasoners" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 178) .
Together with public reason, institutions aimed at reaching the balance of power complete the formal dimension of political constitutionalism. Bellamy distinguishes his notion of balance of power from the concept of separation of
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( 2015) 9 (1) 3 -38 powers typical of legal constitutionalism. Institutions, which serve as the functional division among executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, on the one side, and federalism, on the other, are usually interpreted as negative constraints on governmental power. There is no doubt that republicans recognize the importance of negative strategies for checking power; they are crucial for minimizing domination. Nevertheless, Bellamy intends to pursue a strategy in which the balance of power is not reduced to a negative function. He argues that even more important than that is "the positive role of dividing power in ensuring decision-makers 'hear the other side' " (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 195 ).
In the republican tradition, the balance of power is traditionally associated with the model of the mixed constitution. Ancient and early-modern republicanism conceived the mixed constitution as the distribution of differentiated and exclusive privileges to each specific class of citizen. Driven by an organicist and corporatist view of the polity, such an interpretation understands the classes to be "parts" or "organs" (different but complementary) of the corporate system. The aim of the institutional mixture between monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic principles,
i.e., between the power of one, the power of the few, and the power of the many, was to ensure that "each element performed its respective function and to render them harmonious" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 197) . However, this organicist vision of the mixed constitution lost its predominance from the 17th century onwards. Two major intellectual innovations contributed to that loss: the rise of the mechanical metaphor, inspired by Newtonian physics, and the expansion of the belief in the natural equality of all individuals, disseminated by the theories of natural law.
Those developments engendered a new vision of the mixed constitution. The concept of political body came to be seen as an artificial mechanism instead of a natural body, and the parts of this mechanism came to be viewed as single individuals than as whole classes of people with complementary functions. Of course, the pieces of the mechanism, the individuals, can gather perform group actions; however, the choices by each one of them to do so are at least as relevant as their "innate" differences of status. After these ideological innovations, the balance of power "was no longer a matter of securing the complementary roles of each part of the system"; rather, it was "the product of mutual checks between competing groups" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 198 ).
Bellamy points out the superiority of the mechanical metaphor, which is endowed with a "more attractive conception of pluralism" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 199) and is less susceptible to the shortcomings of the organic one. His presupposition is that it is more efficacious than the organic metaphor to deal with the proliferation of sources of conflict between multiple interest groups in society.
The mechanical metaphor is also more conducive to stimulating the involvement of different groups in coalitions that would sound counterproductive to the interests of classes under the organic and corporatist view. Moreover, "it offers the link between principal and agent" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 200) , something which was not adequately taken into account in the ancient model of the mixed constitution.
The mechanical metaphor favors a model of "mixed constitution" based on the functional separation between executive, legislative, and judiciary powers. But for Bellamy, the approach of political constitutionalism views the doctrine of separation of powers incurring in similar difficulties to those that bedevil the organicist approach. Firstly, it is not that simple to differentiate between legislative, judicial, and executive functions of the state since "each branch of government engages in all three functions in some degree or another" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 202) . Secondly, the model of functional separation does not give enough attention to the role of social groups. It has no mechanisms to avoid the arbitrary power that may arise from a situation in which the same social group exerts disproportionate influence over more than one function of the state. Finally, the model of separation of powers "fails to provide incentives" for the agents entrusted with functional powers to serve the interests of the citizens, as it assumes a vertical structure in which those agents are virtually autonomous in relation to their principals. This lack of accountability is particularly serious in the judicial branch, "which has no mechanism for rendering it accountable for its decisions" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 202) .
In face of the shortcomings of both the organicist and the separation of powers models, Bellamy argues that the most efficient form of balance of power is the one produced by the regular workings of the "actually existing democracies" (BELLAMY, 2007, p. 209) . His aim is to promote a full defense of the normative dimension of contemporary democracies. The "actually existing democracies" are composed of sets of institutional choices extracted from within a broad range of
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(2015) 9 (1) 3 -38 options available throughout the history of ideas, and from the practices of actual democratic regimes. In his book, Bellamy justifies each one of his preferred choices in detail. In this study, I do not intend to reconstruct such justifications; rather I will point out the general lines of his preferred institutional model. Besides attributing the role of protagonists in the democratic scene to professional politicians and political parties, his model of "actually existing democracies" presupposes the following specific choices: representative democracy rather than direct democracy; voting instead of lottery for the appointment of representatives and magistrates; a proportional representative system over a pluralistic electoral system; a parliamentary system over a presidential system; a unicameral parliament over a bicameral parliament; and a unitary system rather than a federalist one.
Machiavellian democracy as a plebeian republic
McCormick's model (2011) Pettit "considers the idea that majority rule accurately approximates popular will to be a threat, perhaps even the greatest threat, to liberty within democracies" (McCORMICK, 2011, p. 148 ).
Parallel to the defense of elections as the most appropriate method of popular participation in politics, Pettit emphatically rejects non-electoral methods-such as lottery-for the appointment of public office holders. He suggests that the electoral mechanism is superior for ensuring accountability on the part of representatives, because they are driven by their interest to be re-elected;
consequently, unlike an officer chosen by lot, they are compelled to keep themselves accountable to their electors. However, according to McCormick, this sort of comparison between lotteries and elections is historically inaccurate. Pettit does not take into account that almost all popular governments that resorted to lottery also relied on mechanisms for the trial of magistrates appointed subsequent to the government leaving office. In the case of their proved misconducts, they were subjected to punishment. Contrary to Pettit, McCormick (2015) 9 (1) 3 -38
concludes that "there is certainly no reliable evidence available that demonstrates the superiority of election/reelection schemes in securing greater elite accountability for citizens to those characterized by lottery/scrutiny; in fact there are serious grounds to conclude just the opposite" (McCORMICK, 2011, p. 149) .
However, as we have seen, Pettit does not exclusively rely on electoral democracy as the sole guarantor of freedom as non-domination. He lists several ways in which it can be distorted, such as the failure of elected officers to keep campaign promises, the exaggerated or undue influence of lobbies on the behavior of such officers, and of course the threat of the "tyranny of the majority". Pettit's solution to avoid distortions generated within the electoral mechanism is the institution of contestatory democracy, through which ordinary citizens and minority groups can challenge laws, policies, and actions they deem detrimental to Pettit (2004) . While Pettit has recently expressed regret regarding the use of that phrase, it is unclear whether he has also declined to defend the process that such a phrase seems to express. Referring specifically to McCormick, Pettit said that that phrase "has helped to bolster the criticism that republicanism, as I interpret it, does not give people a proper, democratic role" (PETTIT, 2012, p. 231) .
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substantive knowledge of the matters involved in those public actions-and whose motivations to be balanced and impartial in their behaviors stem from their desire to be well recognized and well esteemed-would be better equipped to make decisions in those arenas. McCormick considers this call for depoliticization as a "markedly senatorial move". He holds that "Pettit's justifications for such institutions, which assume that the populace is too fickle, uninformed, or influenced by emotion and prejudice to make sound decisions, are strikingly reminiscent of those put forward in favor of senatorial independence by Cicero, Guicciardini, and some of the American founders" (McCORMICK, 2011, p. 156) .
Even the institution of the "ombudsman", which "at first glance" (McCORMICK, 2013, p. 98 McCormick concludes the presentation of his model of republican democracy with a "thought experiment" in the field of contemporary constitutionalism. He invites us to imagine a reform of the United States constitution in which a magistracy reminiscent of the Roman tribunate is established. McCormick warns, "This is a heuristics proposal intended for critical but not necessarily directly practical purposes" (McCORMICK, 2011, p. 183) . Such an institution would be composed of 51 members (aged 21 and over) appointed for a non-renewable one-year term. The members would be chosen by lot from the portion of the population earning an annual household income of less than $345,000, a limit that excludes the richest 10% of the country's population. This magistracy would be a popular power that complements, by checking, the three traditional and functional powers of contemporary republics.
The main constitutional prerogative of this new magistracy would be the possible veto of the "one piece of congressional legislation, one executive order and Supreme Court decision" during a one-year term (McCORMICK, 2011, p. 184 ).
In addition, the "tribunes" would be able to convene a national referendum on any subject once a year; with a minimum of a three-fourths vote, they would also be It is precisely that conception of a mixed constitution that McCormick recovers from Machiavelli. To him, the body politic should not be an assembly of atomized individuals, as in modern constitutionalism. The division of society between the great and the people, the rich and the poor, the few and the many ought to be considered prior to devising any political institutional arrangements.
Regarding the views of many ancient and early-modern thinkers, such differentiation of classes gave rise to markedly corporatist theories of the constitution, which comprehend conflict as a symptom of the corruption of the body politic that compromises the cardinal virtue of concord. However, this is not applicable to Machiavelli's view, as he actually emphasizes the importance of conflict between the people and the great for the proper functioning of a mixed constitution.
With respect to the methods for choosing magistrates and representatives, there is also a clear distinction between the three models of democracy under examination here. Pettit and Bellamy refuse to confer any relevant role to lottery in their models of republican democracy. They both prefer the electoral method for the appointment of officers. Pettit, however, accepts electoral institutions although he has some reservations, since he considers electoral democracy necessary but insufficient to ensure that the people have effective control over governments. In Finally, what about the reformist potential and feasibility of the institutional designs advanced by each of the three models? Pettit rightly points out the dual function that any normative model of democracy must fulfill. On the one hand it must have "a critical, reformist edge" and not merely "vindicate democracy as we know it"; on the other, it must be "institutionally feasible" and be the outcome of "a realistic proposal" rather than an "other-worldly" model or a self-satisfied "utopian pipedream" (PETTIT, 2012, pp. 23, 180 and 181) . However, achieving the proper balance between these two functions is not trivial. As far as institutional reform is concerned, we indeed face a trade-off between realism and a desire for reform. An excess of "realism" leaves no room for invention, making the desire for significant reforms a frustrating reality of cosmetic changes at best.
Conversely, excessively radical reform, regardless of the value of its critical function, tends to result in political and institutional dead ends.
That said, it is important to keep in mind that the degree of reform or realism of a normative model of democracy can only be measured in relation to the political and institutional context in which it is proposed. Considering the contexts of "actually existing democracies", we conclude this essay by suggesting that, on the one hand, both the electoral-contestatory model as well as the model of political constitutionalism run the risk of atrophying their reformist dimensions for the sake of the feasibility of their institutional designs. That would render them unable to face the challenges posed by the dysfunctional aspects of contemporary liberal democracies, as they would lack the required innovations. On the other hand, regardless of his remarkable critique regarding the limits of existing democracies, McCormick's model seems to rely upon ideas and corporate agents that have been inactive for a considerable period of time (to be more specific, since the advent of modern societies). That said, history is replete with examples of the death and resurrection of ideologies. Beliefs abandoned at one time can resurface at another time, and when they do, they can be even stronger than before.
However, the resurrection of ideologies as hypothesized by McCormick may take a long time to transpire. The problem, it seems, is that "actually existing
